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So far, health care policy in the United States is whatever policy
one can impute to a loose constellation of state and federal regulatory
efforts, more or less randomly interacting with federal health care cov-
erage for the elderly, for veterans, and for some of the indigent and
disabled. The federal government also influences the delivery of health
care by subsidizing hospitals directly,' by exempting charitable
hospitals' income from corporate taxes,2 and by allowing employees to
receive health coverage from their employers tax-free.3
There are other powerful institutional forces at work. For years,
most large employers and some unions have been committed to outfit-
ting employees with health care coverage as a fringe benefit of employ-
ment, but recently, as unions have grown weaker, some unionized em-
ployees have lost this fringe on the bargaining table and large employ-
ers have substantially weakened health care coverage for non-unionized
employees.4 Insurers that sell coverage to employers and others have,
* Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. 1967, Louisiana State Univer-
sity; Ph.D. 1977, Cambridge University;, J.D. 1979, University of Texas.
1. The so-called "Hill-Burton Program" created by the Hospital Survey and Construction Act
of 1946, provided matching grants for hospital construction and public health centers through
1974. Act of July 1, 1944, ch. 373, Title VI, § 601, 60 Star. 1041, omitted in genmal revision
of Title VI by Act of Aug. 18, 1964, P.L. 88-443, § 3(a), 78 Stat. 447. Recently, the Dispro-
portionate Share Hospital program, coupled with Medicaid and hence part of the Social Security
Act, has provided large subsidies for hospitals that serve Medicaid patients, and sometimes for
hospitals that do not. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396v (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 C.FR. § 447.296-
.299 (1994) ("disproportionate share hospital" program); Leighton Ku & Teresa A. Coughlin,
Medicaid Disproportionate Share and Other Special Financing Programs, 16 HEAL t CARE FIN.
REv. 27 (Spring 1995).
2. LR.C. § 501(c)(3).
3. Id. § 105.
4. As of 1990, two-thirds of Americans under 65 and three-fourths of employees were cov-
ered by employer-sponsored plans. Hemy R. Aaron, SERIOUS AND UNSrABL.E Co.t DroN 54
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as powerful purchasers of health care packages, begun to dictate the
structure of some health care delivery.5 They have also found them-
selves facing higher prices than the federal government pays for some
of the same hospital procedures; some of these private purchasers of
health services have complained that the success of federal program
cost containment efforts is shifting costs of federally covered procedures
to them.'
A recent Congress encouraged some of these changes in the health
economy by entertaining proposals for a national health care system and
then failing to act.' A new Congress is now threatening to cut back
comprehensive health care for the elderly, the indigent, and the disabled
by means that could undermine federal health care cost containment
programs that have been working
Against this messy background, proposals for revamping the U.S.
health care economy are difficult to assess. Interesting things are hap-
pening in a decentralized way, although only those currently standing to
benefit from the changes, primarily employers, are confident that the
various health care markets will find a globally desirable solution.9 The
flowering of a number of health care plans mandated or sponsored by
state governments can be viewed as an uncoordinated experiment in the
design of government-sponsored plans, one that promises to confirm or
impugn claims made on behalf of national-level health care schemes.
The topic of this Commentary is whether a federally sponsored
health care system implemented through a variety of state plans, can
produce a. satisfactory general result. Professors Mashaw and Marmor
give this topic an engaging specificity. They propose a version of "co-
operative federalism" for comprehensive health care (hereinafter,
"CHCF" for "cooperative health care federalism") that allows the states
(1991). Fewer are covered now and the trend appears to be for employers to curtail employee
insurance coverage. Paul Starr, Look Who's Talking Health Care Reform Now, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
5. Ron Winslow, Employer Group Rethinks Commitment to Big HMOs, WALL ST. J., July
21, 1995, at B1; Ron Winslow, Big Buyers of Health Care Unite to Rate HMOs, WALL ST. J.,
July 3, 1995, at A3; see also Starr, supra note 4.
6. President's Commission on Entitlements (1995).
7. Albert R. Hunt, Politics & People: The Duplicity Wars on Medicare, WALL ST. J., Sept.
21, 1995, at A23 (aftermath of failed Clinton plan changes both private interests and political
parties' views about health care reform); Tim W. Ferguson, Business World: The Upshot of
Health Care's Downfall, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1994, at A17.
8. Robert Pear, Republicans Draw Plan for Slowing Medicare Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1995, § 1, at 1.
9. Starr, supra note 4.
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to experiment and ultimately to differ, within federally imposed limits,
and yet work together to provide comprehensive, portable health care
coverage with a nationally uniform benefit package. As they point out,
the United States has a great deal of experience with cooperative feder-
alism. Medicaid is among the most important examples of such feder-
al/state action, and a comparison of its problems and successes with
those of the considerably more ambitious CHCF deserves close atten-
tion. Other cooperative federalist legislation, notably in the areas of
environmental protection and prevention of employment discrimination,
may also be instructive. The limited track record of uncoordinated,
more or less comprehensive state health care plans holds further les-
sons.
At first glance, CHCF may seem unsatisfactory for three reasons: 1)
the Mashaw/Marmor plan seems only to graft a few broad federal re-
quirements, deliberately formulated in somewhat vague terms, on a
process of individual state experimentation that will probably take place,
whether the federal government takes a hand in it or not; 2) their de-
fense of CHCF does not explain how it would achieve any of the goals
of recent health reformers other than near universal coverage; and 3)
they give no attention to the sluggish tempo of cooperative federalist
programs that require states to devise separate plans of implementation,
submit them for federal approval, and only then put them into opera-
tion. Nevertheless, I believe that in several respects, CHCF would be
preferable to a more thoroughly national health system. It could achieve
some good things at a smaller cost than a uniform mandatory system.
As a preamble to assessing the CHCF, a restatement of the prob-
lems to be addressed through governmentally mandated health care
policy is useful. That is the task of Part II. Part III assesses CHCF in
terms of these goals. Part IV then considers the advantages and disad-
vantages of federalism in comparison to uncoordinated state-level evolu-
tion of comprehensive health care plans.
II. THE GOALS OF MANDATED HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
A. Cost Containment
Containing health care costs is the resounding goal of most health
care reform in this country. The same is beginning to be true in coun-
tries with otherwise successful comprehensive health care systems.10
10. See Marie-Line Cal, Le Nouveau Dispositif de Financement Hospitalier Frangais: Une
1995]
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The justification for this goal is often assumed. Why accelerating health
care costs are a problem deserves brief exploration. Any federal enti-
tlement program that benefits a majority of voters and grows faster than
the economy is a problem for elected officials, because the benefited
majority can insist on the continuation of the program and refuse to un-
derstand the need for adjustments elsewhere-the curtailment of other
programs, higher taxes-to pay for the ballooning entitlement. Medicare
and Social Security are the conspicuous examples. Medicare costs have
been growing faster than the rest of the economy because these costs
are linked to the private market for health care." So, one reason for
worrying about accelerating health care costs is a reason for politicians,
though it affects us all to the extent that it strains the political process.
Another reason for concern about higher health care costs is that
they burden employment or, if employment resists the burden, they
burden business profits linked to labor and can create competitive dis-
advantages between our companies and those in other countries. 12 As
has been mentioned, many large U.S. employers until recently had
accepted the idea that they would provide most of their employees with
generous medical benefit packages. The cost of these packages is pre-
sumably growing faster than employer profits and taxable wages. Em-
ployees, therefore, may not see this cost escalation as their problem.
When employees have the upper hand in negotiations over pay and
benefits, employers are forced to pay more just to keep their employees
as happy as they were in previous years (because the health benefits are
getting more expensive) and may not earn the gratitude of the employ-
ees.
Most members of the public, however, probably do not think of the
two problems just mentioned-that of the politicians who are expected
to preserve an entitlement that is becoming more expensive, and that of
firms pinched by employee reliance on medical fringe benefits-as the
main reasons for worrying about rising health care costs. They probably
think that if paying for health consumes an ever greater fraction of the
Mise en Perspective, Analyse Financiare 14 (May 1995) (government payment of hospital costs
is expected to undergo radical reform in the light of rising medical costs).
11. Katherine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1990, 13 HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV. 29 (1991).
12. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care Spending and American Competitiveness, 8 HEALTH AF-
FAIRS 5 (Winter 1989) (spokespersons for the automobile industry claim that each U.S. automo-
bile incorporates $500 to $700 for health care costs while producers of foreign cars do not have
to bear such costs); but see Aaron, supra note 4, at 100 ("high and rapidly growing U.S. health
care costs do not much affect overall U.S. international competitiveness").
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gross domestic product, society as a whole is less well off, just as a
household suffers if its health costs steadily rise. Apart from political
disruption and the creation of private competitive disadvantages, howev-
er, that is not necessarily the case. Money spent on health care does
not go up in smoke. It goes to pay health care providers' salaries and
provide profits for investors in health care and insurance firms. The
salaries and profits are spent or saved in this country. Hence, like the
disproportionate growth of the military budget during the "Star Wars"
program of the 1980s, the growth of the national health budget is bal-
anced at least in part by concomitant growth elsewhere in the private
economy. The primary effect of the rapid growth of the health care
industry may be its competition with other industries for resources and
investment, but that merely resembles the growth of any other industry,
such as the automobile industry in the first half of the century or other
technology-driven industries (health care is, of course; one of these) in
the second half. An important secondary effect, in view of state respon-
sibility for a portion of the Medicaid budget, is the imposition of accel-
erating. costs on states that cannot finance them, as the federal govern-
ment can. This distortion, however, is rationally removed by federaliz-
ing the entire Medicaid budget. 3
Accordingly, the significance of accelerating health care costs is not
as straightforward as many members of the public assume. If health
care cost increases are slowed, the result will be, in part, not just to
stanch waste but also to curtail a growing industry that has fewer
externalities than others that may replace it. If we don't spend our
money on health care, we may spend it on cars or weapons.
Nevertheless, politicians (who of course represent people) feel an
overwhelming need to keep the governmental share of the economy
from growing out of proportion to the private share and to hold con-
stant the health care share within the governmental share. Given that
need, only federal measures to contain health costs will do. This is one
of the acknowledged goals of health care reform.
B. Extension of Coverage
Another goal of health care reform is to extend the benefits of
13. At the moment, the Republican Congressional majority is trying to shift more of the
Medicaid budgetary responsibility to the states, rather than the reverse. Christopher Georges,
Senate Republicans' Medicare Overhaul Would Mean Higher Fees for Recipients. VALL ST. 1,
Sept. 13, 1995, at A3.
19951
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
health care to a greater part of the population. There is an obvious
tension between this goal and that of containing health care costs, al-
though better health care for the indigent would probably avoid other
costs for which the federal or state governments must ultimately take
responsibility.
C. Making Coverage Portable
As Professors Mashaw and Marmor note, about ten percent of
Americans are, by some estimates, "locked into" employment by the
threat of losing their health care coverage. 4 CHCF is intended to
make health care coverage portable, no matter how individual states'
health programs may differ. Although the details are sketchy, CHCF's
proposed federal block grants apparently would be conditioned on each
state's agreement to provide coverage automatically to other states'
citizens or residents who might move to it. Professors Mashaw and
Marmor take the interesting position that CHCF should not require the
States to cover illegal aliens. They seem to think the federal govern-
ment might comfortably lend its weight to the trend, in California and
elsewhere, of efforts to discriminate between legal and illegal residents
in the provision of basic social benefits.
D. Redirecting Expenditures
Redirecting health care expenditures to achieve overall greater bene-
fit per dollar spent is a goal closely related to, and sometimes included
in, that of containing health care costs. It is often argued, for example,
that much health care is reactive rather than preventive and that the
right kind of health coverage would focus on health education and early
diagnosis of disease rather than on expensive, though more dramatic,
medical responses to full-blown health problems. It is worth mentioning
this as a separate goal from cost containment because achieving greater
benefit for the same health care dollars is a goal worthy of pursuit
apart from the perhaps more politically sensitive goal of cost contain-
ment. Moreover, cost containment could be achieved by means that are
cost-inefficient, i.e., that lower the benefit per dollar spent.
14. Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Health Care
Reform, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 115 (1995).
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E. Research and Related Goals
Health care reform also may focus on a number of goals that have
little to do with the fiscal burden of health care. For example, it is
frequently lamented that we have begun only to study the effectiveness
of particular treatments. "Outcomes research," as it is sometimes called,
requires data collection and analysis. It also requires a legal framework
adequate to protect the privacy of patients and their freedom from un-
justifiable governmental intervention in their decisions.'5 Many have
argued that the data necessary for outcomes research is already collect-
ed by private parties-physicians, hospitals, insurers, employers, and so
forth-and that the expense of collecting this information is partly
squandered if outcomes research is not done; private parties, however,
have no motive to undertake such research. Federal involvement there-
fore might be justified by the goal of providing this public good, which
is already economically within our grasp.
F. Rationing Scarce Resources
Another health care reform goal that may be subsumed under cost
containment, but which deserves separate mention, is that of rationing
scarce health care resources. A comprehensive approach to health care
might assure a fairer and more rational allocation of donated organs
among those who need them-a rationing problem that is more or less
independent of cost containment. Such an approach might also assure
better availability of health care in less populous and less prosperous
parts of the country, and thereto might intervene in medical school
funding to assure a supply of appropriate generalists and specialists.
G. Summary
It is evident that the widely, if not universally, decried crisis of
health care is not a single problem, at least if these disparate goals of
health care reform are all taken seriously. Fashioning a policy response
may involve some but not all of these goals. The CHCF appears to
respond to multiple goals, just as the Clinton Health Plan did and as do
current proposals before Congress for limiting the federal government's
15. Of course, privacy and liberty to decide as one chooses both have constitutional dimen-
sions, under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteen Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V. M.V.
1995]
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responsibility for health care. Not all health care reform addresses all
the same issues, however. The congressional initiatives just mentioned,
for example, would do nothing to disfavor wasteful medical technology
or respond at all to the impoverishment of the catastrophically ill. The
Clinton Health Plan, though premised on the need for health care cost
containment, would have slowed the acceleration of health care costs,
by its proponents' own figures, only at a fairly distant future date.
What can be said of the goals and likely efficacy of CHCF?
Ill. CAN CHCF ACHIEVE ITS GoALs?
A. Cost Containment
The goal that Professors Mashaw and Marmor place in highest
profile is that of universal (or almost universal) medical coverage. To
require coverage to any extent must also be to specify with some preci-
sion what that coverage will provide. So, they include among the fed-
eral minimum requirements a definition of what is usually referred to as
the "benefit package." The benefit package is the array of health-related
treatments and services to which an insured or covered individual is en-
titled under a given health plan. Hence, their version of cooperative
federalism would strive to extend somewhat uniform health care rights
to almost all U.S. residents.
To explore this feature of the proposal more fully, it is worthwhile
to compare the federal regulatory structure CHCF would require with
that of some of our principal environmental regulatory programs. The
Clean Air Act,'6 for example, announced national standards for con-
trolling air pollution from the release of specified substances into the
air. It involved the states in meeting those standards by granting pro-
gram funding to them in exchange for their enactment of legislation
that implemented means of achieving the national standards. The state
plans were supposed to be free to vary greatly; national oversight was
essentially limited to the review of state plan design at the outset and
review of state enforcement of these plans. CHCF, too, would provide
block grants for state health care plans that met some basic national
health care goals, such as near-universality of coverage.
Like the environmental legislation, the proposed health care scheme
could impose design elements on the State block-grant recipients. What
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988).
[Vol. 28:127
FEDERALISM IN HEALTH CARE: COSTS AND BENEFITS
would not be imposed is a single scheme of health care delivery or
financing. States would be free to choose to provide membership in
HMOs through state-provided grants directly to individuals (either in the
form of actual transfer payments or in the form of tax credits), or in-
stead to enroll unemployed residents in state-approved HMOs while
mandating that employers provide their employees with similar, but not
necessarily identical, coverage through commercial insurance or self-in-
surance. Professors Mashaw and Marmor also suggest that states
might, under their proposal, provide more or less generous coverage,
consistent with the mandate that they all provide the same benefit pack-
age. How is there room for variation in the "luxury" of different pro-
grams if all deliver the same benefits? Although they do not give ex-
amples, I take it that Professors Mashaw and Marmor have in mind the
following types of variation:
* Plans could differ in the method by which they determine whether
a covered individual is entitled to a given treatment, with the result that
some plans pay for that treatment on a lower showing of medical ne-
cessity than others do. Thus, for example, a state plan might impose
"managed care" review of treatment to curtail unnecessary provision of
benefits, or use a "gate-keeper" method of review, or adopt any of
several already well-tried (if not necessarily proven) alternatives.
0 Plans could impose financial thresholds, like the "deductibles" of
familiar commercial health care insurance policies, although the federal
universal-coverage requirement would presumably outlaw such thresh-
olds for the indigent.
0 Plans could perhaps use other systems of explicit rationing, while
nonetheless passing muster under the federal universal-coverage require-
ment.
It is worthwhile to point out that not all familiar methods of ration-
ing seem obviously consistent with the idea of a nationally uniform
benefit package. The Oregon Plan," for example, rations health servic-
es, so far only to Medicaid recipients and some others, by ranking
diagnosis-treatment pairs and funding only those above a certain rank.
Thus, in Oregon, an effective drug treatment for gout might be exclud-
ed altogether from the benefit package on the grounds that this type of
treatment for this disease does not benefit the collective welfare of
Oregonians as much as other funded diagnosis-treatment pairs, such as
appendectomies for those suffering from acute appendicitis.
17. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 414.025-414.750 (1991).
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Traditional physician gate-keeper rationing, 8 at least if governed
by a relatively rigid limitation on funds available for medical treatment,
also appears to be inconsistent with a federally defined benefit package.
Thus, for example, if the gate-keepers sufficiently embrace the spirit of
the financial limits, the result might be that even some for whom the
system might provide benefits do not receive these benefits in a given
year, simply because others have received other benefits earlier in the
year. Since less funding would remain to provide these benefits, the
gate-keepers would become additionally reluctant to authorize treatment
because of the potential financial shortfall. It is difficult to see how this
kind of rationing could be regarded as living up to the mandated provi-
sion of certain benefits.
Given that the cooperative federalist health legislation would allow
states to vary some of the details of mandated health coverage, does the
resulting scheme promise to contain health costs? Despite Professors
Mashaw's and Marmor's claim that cost containment is a goal of their
proposed system, it is not clear how the elements of the cooperative
federalism they propose would advance that goal. Here are some possi-
bilities, however, consistent with their proposal. A central federal body,
analogous to the Health Security Board to be created by the Clinton
Health Security Act, would oversee aggregate federal and state spend-
ing, and it would periodically redefine the mandated benefits package or
limit block grants to the states to achieve targeted spending limits. This
was the core of the Clinton plan. To introduce it into the proposed
scheme would be to make the proposed cooperative federalism all but
indistinguishable from the Clinton plan. It is true that the latter would
have favored a style of "managed competition" that gave primacy to the
role of "purchasing alliances" to preserve competition among insurance
companies, HMOs, etc., that antedated the national health legislation.
The proposed federalist alternative has no such preference for managed
competition; even the Clinton plan allowed waivers of this competitive
mechanism, and so it deserves to be considered virtually as flexible in
this regard.
Another possibility is that CHCF would seek to contain costs by
tying block grants to some changing indicator of national and/or state
economic product. The simplest version of this limitation would be an
18. 1 am thinking here of the style of rationing practiced in Great Britain, but I am not sure
that my description is still accurate of the British National Health Service. See JEREMY HURST,
THE REFORM OF HEALTH CARE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEVEN OECD COUNTRIES 113-
129 (1992) [hereinafter "OECD Study"].
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inflexible rule that aggregate block grants to the states for health care
could not exceed some permanently fixed percentage of the national
gross domestic product. During the writing of the Clinton plan, discus-
sion of the German national health care system often focused on what
looks like a cost containment mechanism of this sort.
It is often stated that the German system limits health care costs to
an ungraduated percentage of income, so that a percentage of national
income (measured not in the usual way, but as an aggregate of individ-
ual incomes) is the national limit on health care costs. Most advocates
of national health care reform admit that the German solution, if it is
correctly understood as imposing the kind of limit just described, works
only because of Germany's long experience with publicly manipulated
bargaining between private parties over health care. Health care provid-
ers strain to make the system work; health care consumers strain to be
content with the system; and the government strains to find ways not to
impugn the good record of the system, e.g., by subsidizing aspects of
health care provision that could not otherwise be brought within the
payroll percentage formula. If it was implausible to hope to import the
German mechanism to this country as part of the Clinton plan, it is not
more plausible to have that hope in conjunction with CHCF.
Is cost containment, however, a serious part of the rationale of
CHCF? Need it be? The other goals of health care reform obviously
have less political pull than does cost containment, for the reasons set
forth in Part II above. Cost containment does not simply appeal to
politicians, it is positively compelling to politicians, but only as long as
the governmental share of health care grows uncontrollably. CHCF
promises to change all that by the simple expedient of instituting a
block grant system. If our Congress were left to preside over a CHCF
system, it would hold the purse strings again over health care, just as
the current Republican Congress hopes to do, by instituting a block
grant system for Medicare and by simplifying and constraining the
existing block grant system for Medicaid. 19
Cynically, then, we might say that CHCF is bound to succeed in
doing what politicians, the real lobby for cost containment, want done.
This is so at least at the federal level. What about state politicians?
Some of them too have been suffering from the uncontrollable rise of
health care costs, packaged as the state share of Medicaid; others actu-
ally have been solving political problems by "gaming" the Medicaid
19. See Pear, supra note 8; Starr, supra note 4.
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reimbursement system.20 At least the political elite in those states that
have experienced wrenching cost overruns under Medicaid would proba-
bly die before they sought to participate in CHCF, unless it, too, were
susceptible of manipulation, as Medicaid has proven to be.2
B. Extension of Coverage
CHCF obviously is intended to assure almost universal coverage.
Professors Mashaw and Marmor note that some of those countries
deemed to have the most comprehensive health care systems neverthe-
less do not cover all citizens or residents. Twenty to twenty-five percent
of German citizens, for example, do not participate in the German state-
sponsored health care system, and approximately five percent have no
coverage at all.' Those left out of the German health care system,
however, are almost exclusively among the extremely wealthy, for
whom medical insurance is unnecessary - they can comfortably "self-in-
sure." Professors Mashaw and Marmor say that CHCF should be con-
sidered satisfactory if it extends coverage to the same extent.
It is relevant at this point to compare the resulting pattern of cover-
age with current, pre-reform patterns. Professors Mashaw and Marmor
state that "states should be allowed (with federal approval) to fold
Medicare and Medicaid into their reformed health care insurance sys-
tems." This could provide an important political lift, at least from
one base of power within the body politic. Around the time the Clinton
plan was written, large employers eagerly supported health care reform.
It was widely reported that these employers stood to gain by seeing
their cost for employee health coverage reduced if all or almost all
Americans were covered by a federally monitored plan. Existing federal
health programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal governmental
health plans) already systematically undercompensated health providers,
especially hospitals, through such waste reduction schemes as diagnosis-
related group (DRG) ceilings on reimbursement, and large private sector
20. Professors Mashaw and Marmor may intend to refer to the seemingly unjustified variation
among states under the current Medicaid reimbursement arrangements when they say that "[t]he
size of the total grant (and the per capita components) should vary with a state's income, its
demographic profile and its history of medical inflation." See Marshaw & Marmor, supra note
14, at 119 (emphasis added).
21. For examples of manipulation, see Steve Cole, Winners and Losers States Could Suffer
as Congress divides the Medicaid Pie, HEALTH SYS. REV., May/June 1995, at 17.
22. See OECD Study, supra note 18, at 57, 59.
23. Marshaw & Marmor, supra note 14, at 118.
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purchasers of health services or group health coverage believed the
providers systematically charged them higher fees for services to make
up the difference. If federal monitoring were either abolished or extend-
ed to virtually all provision of health services, large employers hoped
they would no longer suffer from 'such "cost shifting." 4
If this perception continued to be correct in 1995, CHCF would
benefit large employers and insurers significantly, at least to the extent
that state plans did not deny large employers the option of self-insuring,
or merely of self-insuring in the manner they choose, and did not take
business away from insurers, e.g., by fostering state single-payer sys-
tems. The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) might, by
the same token, be expected to oppose the legislation on the grounds
that it would make current Medicare benefit levels more expensive and
jeopardize them as state budget items. The AARP, however, could be
expected to oppose CHCF on more elementary grounds-it would give
states discretion to whittle away at this important benefit for the retired
and elderly, for which the AARP fought during the writing of the
Clinton plan.
It is also interesting to wonder whether CHCF would take so much
away from large employers as to ensure that they would fight the pas-
sage of such legislation. Professors Mashaw and Marmor say that "Con-
gress ... must ... enact ... legislation (such as reform of [ERISA])
that allows states sufficient legal discretion to pursue health care reform
realistically." What they are referring to is the peculiar benefit such
employers currently enjoy of exemption from state insurance regulation
on the grounds that employer-provided health insurance is an employee
benefit regulated by ERISA, that preempts state regulation. Employ-
ers, of course, may choose to self-insure for reasons other than escaping
state insurance regulation and state taxes on insurance products; they
may find it cheaper to self-insure (even if they pay insurance compa-
24. Donald Moran, John Sheils, Lewin/ICF, EMLOYER COST-SIUFriNG XrENDREs. FINAL
REPORT, Table 8 (1991) (a report prepared for the National Association of Manufacturers con-
cluding that in 1991 about S172 billion in health care costs shifted from governnment-covered
patients to employer-sponsored plan participants) (on file with author).
25. Marshaw & Marmor, supra note 14, at 118.
26. See 29 US.C. § 1144 (1994). The Supreme Court has held that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 111 1986). regu-
lates employee benefit plans and preempts state law applicable to them. Although ERISA does
not interfere with state regulation of insurance, a state law that "'purport[s to regulate
insurance' cannot deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company." Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 US. 41 (1987).
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nies to administer their self-insurance schemes), than to buy insurance
from others, because the employers have greater bargaining power with
health care providers in some settings than insurers in a splintered in-
surance market do. Some self-insuring employers achieve significant
savings, however, simply by avoiding state regulation and taxes.
C. Making Coverage Portable
CHCF scores an easy victory under this heading, which describes
what is certainly one of the paramount goals of health care reform.
Professors Mashaw and Marmor do not believe that what interstate
variation in health benefits there might be "would not have a major
impact on location decisions either of individuals or firms."'2  This is
at least controversial. It is true that the literature about governmental
benefits and location decisions provides no strongly predictive account
of the influence of one on the other.' Some states are beginning to
invest heavily in efforts to attract new employers, however, especially
by removing regulatory burdens and funding employee training.29 If a
state can portray itself as attractive because it has no strong labor un-
ions, schools are good, health care is generous (or self-insurance is le-
niently regulated), and taxes are low, an employer might well prefer it
to a state in which only health care is generous (or self-insurance is
stringently regulated).
In other words, by removing health care as an issue for the em-
ployer, an otherwise less attractive state may make its few attractions
more compelling. No doubt, this possibility is sufficiently diffuse as not
to arouse strong opposition to CHCF. The use of state variations in
health care to achieve other economic goals is, I think, a very serious
possibility, however, especially given other demographic differences
among the states. Some have much larger elderly populations than
27. Marshaw & Marmor, supra note 14, at 122.
28. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956); Daniel N. Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90
Mxci. L. Riv. 895, 906 (1992).
29. Fred R. Bleakley, Economy: Many Firms Press States for Concessions-Tax, Other Deals
Sought To Head Off Defections, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A2; Ken Gepfert Southeast
Journal: Economic Focus As States Seek New Firms, Old Ones Feel Slighted, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 1995, at SI; Jacqueline Bueno and Ken Gepfert, Governors-Elect Map Strategies For
Aggressive Business Growth, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1994, at S1; Timothy D. Schellhardt, Enter-
prise: Most Statehouses Likely to Weigh Aid to Small Firms-Surveys Find That Budget Crisis
Fail to Discourage Plans for Action, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1992, at B2.
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others; this alone will incline them to rely less on employer mandates
for health care than might be the case if the elderly population were
quite small. Since some states may have fewer choices, CHCF may
become a competitive weapon. Again, however, the upshot is hard to
foresee.
D. Research and Related Goals
We have seen that research into the efficacy of medical procedures,
drugs, and so forth is sorely lacking in our currently anarchic, though
vital, health care economy.30 It would be natural for CHCF to lodge
authority for the regulation of data collection and retrieval at the na-
tional level, precisely because the absence of a central authority would
encumber states' and private parties' efforts to coordinate such data
analysis. At present, the absence of comprehensive federal regulation of
hospitals is the single largest impediment to the efforts of insurers and
managed care providers to compare outcomes. Structural features of
CHCF, however, might deprive such data of some of its comparative
value. If one state's health care is rationed by peer review mechanisms
while another relies on personal physician gatekeepers, the data these
states contribute to a national clearing house are likely to differ in
form. Peer review groups must generate written commentary, while
physician gatekeepers need not do so, and may do so reluctantly if
placed under such an obligation.
E. Allocation of Scarce Resources
Rationing is usually considered in the health care reform context
only as a means of achieving cost containment. It is, of course, also a
means of assuring fairness and rationality in other respects. However
much the country may choose collectively to spend on health care, it
should guarantee everyone affected by national intervention in the
health economy that health benefits will flow evenly and equitably, at
least in so far as sovereign intrusions shape the flow at all.
Private alliances of hospitals and physicians already allocate scarce
30. "Outcomes" research, as it is sometimes called, has only been initiated recently on a
large scale in this country. See Aaron, supra note 4. at 49 ("[mlost common medical procedures
have never been subject to controlled evaluation to determine in which cases the procedures
produce expected benefits and whether alternative approaches might be superior"); see John E.
Wennberg, Outcomes Research, Cost Containment, and the Fear of Health Care Rationing. 322
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990).
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medical resources other than money-donated organs, for example. It is
conceivable that they do so well or could do so, without governmental
interference. Whether such systems operate equitably across large re-
gions of the country is another matter. It is not clear that they must,
but if so, it is presumably in the interest of all concerned to foster
mechanisms for fair and orderly allocation. No part of the country has
privileged access to all its resource needs and none has notably greater
needs than another. CHCF actually might encourage healthy decentral-
ized coordination of these efforts.
There is one respect, however, in which government intervention for
fairness in rationing may be indispensable. It is sometimes supposed
that since marginal health care dollars buy diminishing benefits for
individuals, the same must be true for society as a whole, i.e., that the
last dollars devoted to health care purchase smaller gains in health. It is
probable that many who are confident of the fairness and decency of
rationing base their conviction on the slightness, if not complete lack of
value, of marginal health care outlays.
The leap from the individual to society, however, is not clearly
justified. From the fact, if it is one, that every individual faces a di-
minishing benefit curve, it does not follow that society faces a similar
curve. In other words, if we could add together individual benefits for
dollars spent, the resulting curve for all individuals residing in a given
country would not necessarily resemble that of the individuals, even if
all individuals' curves were of similar shape. This is so for several
reasons. First, the rate at which benefits fall for different individuals
may be different, even though all individuals face similarly shaped
curves, because the cost of getting different individuals to the same lev-
el of benefit can vary enormously: a very ill person may benefit less
than a healthy person does from the first $500 spent on health in a
given year, because the ill person may require a far more costly regime
in order to benefit at all. Second, time frames for reaching the small-
benefit portion of the curve may differ for different individuals. Third,
health care is full of externalities, so that cutting back on health care
for virtually everyone, at virtually no loss to them in overall health,
may result in enormous losses to others, who are more at risk from
diseases that can be wiped out only if everyone is (e.g., vaccination
against certain diseases).
CHCF, by adding universality of coverage to the other desirable
outcomes of state-by-state innovation, would have a chance therefore of
securing one of the more important goals of a truly national health
policy, and probably at a lower cost, since it would not require two full
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layers of regulatory effort at the federal and state levels.
F. Redirecting Expenditures
Finally, a federal health care system that allows interstate variation
in health care financing and delivery cannot achieve the re-direction of
health care outlays as strategically and simply as might a centralized
national system. Yet the Clinton plan would have been no better able to
redirect outlays, given its deference to reasonable state plans for health
care delivery.
IV. WHAT WOULD BE LOST IF NATIONAL MANDATES %VERE
ABSENT?
Professors Mashaw and Marmor obviously attach high priority to
almost universal coverage. Broad coverage and portability are, one
might say, the main price they would exact from the states in return for
federal block grants for state health care systems. It is worthwhile to
ask whether either or both need be required, in order to be realized
under a block grant system.
Consider portability first. Many of the costly benefits local govern-
mental units provide their residents are currently available to everyone
without length-of-residence requirements-police, fire protection, educa-
tion. It may be that states are not tempted to discriminate in most cases
because of the difficulty of the necessary discrimination. The police
may discriminate haphazardly against some parts of the population, but
if required to discriminate against only those who have recently arrived,
they would surely fail.
Discrimination in the provision of health treatment poses no such
problem. Most private and public health plans in most countries require
eligible participants to carry appropriate identification. That could be
done here too. What state, however, would want to penalize legal im-
migration from other states? Immigration is essential to provide em-
ployees of all sorts during times of economic expansion. Denying health
care benefits to those who have them in other states and who would
seek employment in this state, where they could be provided with de
facto reciprocity for this state's citizens if they should go elsewhere,
would burden the local economy; local businesses would surely lobby
for reciprocal provision of health benefits.
The same applies to differences in coverage from one state to the
next. If Connecticut were particularly stingy in the design of its state
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health care system, should it and its residents not expect that economic
growth would come only with added difficulty? Moreover, the state and
its employers would find it difficult to keep needed employees here, if
better benefits were available elsewhere.
What would CHCF look like without mandated broad coverage and
portability? Broadly speaking, this is like asking what would happen if
the federal government replaced Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal
medical benefit programs with block grants to the states, as some mem-
bers of the Republican majority in Congress, until recently, advocated
doing. Would the block grants be adequate to permit states that wished
to do so to maintain benefits for their citizens at current or better lev-
els? How would one compute the amount of the necessary block grant,
given that the states are left free to design idiosyncratic health care
delivery systems, and given our current lack of consensus about which
means are least expensive?
Charles Tiebout argued, in a well-known article on tax policy,"'
that permissive federalism would maximize the welfare of citizens free
to choose where they would live, because local governmental authorities
would offer those packages of benefits for which there was sufficient
demand to generate the taxes necessary to pay for them. 2 It would be
fine for different towns to provide fundamentally different programs of
land use regulation, or streets of vastly different quality, because people
would simply move from one town to another in accordance with their
tastes and pay taxes to the municipality of their choice. If enough peo-
ple choose each town, all would continue to offer their idiosyncratic
packages of benefits; if any town fails to attract a sufficient group of
taxpayers, it will go out of business or change its public benefit pack-
age. Different tastes will be satisfied by the variety of offerings, and
welfare will be maximized because those who choose to pay for more
expensive public benefits will be those to whom they have correspond-
ing utility, while others will choose less expensive benefits and pay
less.
Tiebout's argument depends on important simplifying assumptions.
For example, people must be reasonable enough to move to get what
they want, and moving must be cheap, relatively speaking. If the real
world approximates the model closely enough, the resulting welfare
maximum should be achieved with respect to public benefits of all
31. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
32. See STEPHEN G. Uz, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL
DEBATEs 216-19 (1993).
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sorts, including health care benefits. Indeed, it should be achieved even
without federal block grants, so long as the federal government does
not offer competing benefits.
Sadly, this picture of efficiency through the independence of feder-
ally linked local governments is implausible. There is too much friction
in the machinery of the market for municipal public goods. People
cannot move easily. Jobs and houses are not portable, and the uncer-
tainty and other costs associated with moving are immense for many
people.
Does that support the idea of block grants? Perhaps. The lesson of
Tiebout's argument is that it shows us by means of its simplifying
assumptions, where in the machinery some of the friction is. It is not
that local governments are reluctant to innovate for reasons that an
influx of money from the central government would remedy. Rather, it
is the inability of people to go where the benefits they want are to be
had. Block grants would aid state health care innovation, therefore, if
they took the form of transfer payments to individuals who wished to
move from New Hampshire to Arizona. Block grants to local govern-
ments themselves may be useful to persuade them to aspire to near-
universal health coverage. The level of these block grants, however,
should be just enough to pay for near-universality. Local governments
should otherwise be left to pay the cost of their idiosyncratic health
care packages with locally raised taxes. Otherwise, we should not ex-
pect the political process at the local level to guide governing officials
to those benefit packages that, in crazy juxtaposition, will yield the
greatest overall benefit.
It will no doubt be objected that few in this country have so much
confidence in local government. Health care is too important to be left
to the competence and whims of local officials or even to the self-
knowledge of local taxpayers.33 That may well be so, but if it is, we
have little to hope for from CHCF, because we have no reason to ex-
pect local officials to devise good health care plans.
33. See C. Duane Daner, Giving Medicaid Back to the States, HEALTH SYS. REV. May/Jun.
1995, at 29, 30 (May/June 1995) (if Medicaid is given back to the states in a form that caps
federal funds, services will be cut back, access will be compromised, maintenance and replace-
ment of buildings and equipment will be delayed and new technology will not be acquired); but
see Jean L Thorne et al., State Perspectives on Health Care Reform: Oregon, Hawaii, Tennes-
see, and Rhode Island, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 121 (1995) (states now in the vanguard of
health care reform have begun to overcome difficulties through cooperation among themselves
and with the Health Care Financing Administration).
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My conclusion is that block grants, if given, should be without
strings. If this seems unwise, block grants are unwise altogether.
